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Humanism is dead. The obituary has 
published in two books. One, in 
significantly titled The Death of 
been recently 
English, is 
Literature. It 
announces, with some regret, that 
the Bastilles of the old literature, the 
reality of "literature," the creativity of the 
author, the superiority of authors and 
literary works to critics and readers, and 
the integrity of the literary art work, have 
now all been stormed. The attackers carried 
many banners, but all were associated with 
the political radicalism of recent decades, 
and all drew their authority in varying ways 
and degrees from two closely connected 
skepticisms, structuralism and post -
structuralism or deconstruction.(Kernan 
77) 
The other book is in Arabic and bears a more 
significant title, mowtu-1-'insaan [The Death of Man]. 
The author, Addoway, conducts his autopsy, also with 
regret, by analyzing the major works of leading 
figures in the Modern Age: Nietzsche, Heideggar, 
Strauss, Althusser, and Foucault. 
Notwithstanding the resuscitating efforts of some 
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humanists such as Daniel Schwarz in his book The 
Case for a Humanistic Poetics and Sean Burke in his 
book The Death and Return of th·e Author, one has to 
admit that the humanistic crisis is real, though not 
peculiarly modern, and that the obituary speaks of 
idealistic humanism, which, as Burns shows, first 
came to light in fourteenth-century Europe and was 
championed and disseminated by such prominent 
figures as Petrarch, Boccaccio, Erasmus, Thomas 
More, and Bruno. These, buoyed by optimism, admitted 
of no limits to man's potential. They tended to see 
him as a special creature endowed with freedom, 
consciousness, intelligence, creativity, and initiative, 
and occupying a central position on earth, which in 
Ptolemy's astronomy was itself the center of the 
universe. Just as Ptolemy's astronomy was 
contradicted by Copernicus', this spirited humanism 
was early challenged and threatened from inside by 
internal division and from outside by grim historical 
realities represented by Machiavelli in Italy and later 
by Hobbes in England, both of whom stressed man's 
limitations, weaknesses, and corruptibility and 
presented the ideals of the sister humanism as 
wishful thought belied by man's condition in nature, a 
condition plagued by inequality, injustice, and 
aggression. Consequently, a sense of mission among 
humanists evolved. The crusading spirit took the 
shape of criticism and satire directed against the 
socio-political system in order to improve man's life 
on earth. No longer central in the cosmic order, man 
here lies in need of pity, help, and commiseration, and 
the necessity arises for a system of rules and values 
to redress the imbalance of nature. 1 
Arnold's efforts in this regard cannot be denied. His 
humanism, whether as a study of the human spirit, a 
persistent search for a better life for man, or a 
sustained and tenacious critisism of Victorian 
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society, pervades his work both in prose and verse. 
However, his well-known humanistic program, 
outlined in his major prose works --apart from its 
utopian, wishfully contemplative nature-- is 
permeated by inner inconsistencies, by incoherent 
views of human nature as he moves from poetry to 
prose and by complex personal factors, all of which 
delineate a certain impasse while betraying a 
persistent process of repression, sublimation, and 
displacement which informs his development as a 
writer and a humanist 
That religion constitutes one of the foundations of 
Arnold's humanism hardly stands in need of any proof. 
For him the ultimate objective of culture is "to make 
reason and the will of God prevaii"(Culture and 
Anarchy 478), a religiously moral mission as perfect 
as all theoretical programs. It evidently marks 
Arnold's imagination, dream, and contemplative 
spirit, though the possibility of turning it into action 
through "reading, observing and thinking"(Cultu re 518) 
is attested to by the work of two German thinkers, 
Lessing and Herder, who, having had their lesson from 
St. Augustine, "humanized knowledge ... broadened the 
basis of life and intelligence ... worked powerfully to 
diffuse sweetness and light, to make reason and the 
will of God prevaii"(Culture 500). 
However, this basic ideal and ultimate objective, 
this difficult marriage of the Enlightenment and 
Medievalism, rests on religious assumptions that 
Arnold himself undercuts, whether consciously or not. 
Some of these assumptions are God's existence and 
the compatibility of His will and reason. Arnold's 
position in this regard is not consistent enough to 
sustain such a formidable program, as we shall see. 
His assaults on religion and Christian sects are 
widely spread over his career. 2 In Culture and Anarchy 
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religion is accused of narrowness of scope. It has 
failed because it tends to emphasize the soul over and 
above the other powers at work in man. In his 
religious writings of the 1870s he betrays a serious 
disjunction between a positivistic adherence to facts 
and his emotionally moral convictions. The subject of 
Literature and Dogma, as he says in the "Preface" to 
God and the Bible, is to show the "truth and necessity 
of Christianity, and its power and charm for the 
heart, mind, and imagination of man, even though the 
preternatural, which is now its popular sanction, 
should have to be given up"(1197). Arnold seems to 
have assigned to himself the redoubtable task of 
saving Christianity after decapitating it, though God 
or, at least, His shadow keeps coming back. Christian 
theologians, he says, distorted Christianity by dealing 
with the Bible as "scientific and fit matter for the 
application of their powers of abstruse reasoning to 
it"(Literature and Dogma 1197). According to this 
argument, the theologians' reasoning is wrong in 
admitting aberglaube, and Arnold is right in rejecting 
it. So, human reason is not one but multiple. What the 
theologians accept as true in the Bible, Arnold 
classifies as fairy-tale stuff. The Second Advent, the 
Trinity, and immortality are all fairy-tale materials. 
Satan is a shadow of man's "guilt and terrors"(Dogma 
1202). Heaven is also a shadow, like the Greek 
Olympus. 
In a world characterized by what Miller calls the 
disappearance of God, the emphasis shifts to Jesus, 
and Christianity is reduced to his method, secret, and 
the sweetness of his reasonableness. Jesus' 
righteousness is summed up in renunciation and 
conscience. Moreover, Jesus himself is reduced, as in 
Emerson, to a better man and loses his Christian 
identity as a member of the Trinity. By humanizing 
Christ, Arnold makes him a possible prototype of his 
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aliens, a sublimated human being to be emulated. In a 
skeptical age, Arnold represses the supernatural, 
though his decision seems more of a verbal strategy 
than actual murder, and religion functions more like a 
pragmatic means to safeguard morality than a system 
of truths: 
Whatever his skepticism as to the alleged 
meta- physical basis of the traditional 
classical-Christian synthesis of European 
civilization, Arnold's chief concern was to 
provide a means by which men in 
future might keep the imaginative and 
emotional supports and safeguards of 
inherited patterns of thought, feeling and 
morality. (Delaura 154) 
Similar views occurring in various works confirm 
his position. In a letter to Ernest Fontanes he is 
dogmatically explicit about his situation. As usual, he 
lashes out at concrete opponents, this time at the 
Ritualists and Miss Frances Cobbe, "The force which 
is shaping the future is with neither; nor with any of 
the orthodox religions, or with any of the neo-
religious developments which propose to themselves 
to supersede them"(qtd. in Delaura 60). And to crown 
his position, he in "The Study of Poetry" pronounces 
the death of religion from failure of its facts and 
enthrones a sublimated species of poetry in its place, 
for Arnold's mind is ineluctably theistic: 
Our religion has materialized itself in the 
fact, in the supposed fact; it has attached its 
emotion to the fact, and now the fact is 
failing it. But for poetry the idea is 
everything; the rest is a world of illusion, of 
divine illusion. Poetry attaches its 
emotion to the idea; the idea is the fact. The 
strongest part of our religion to-day is its 
un- conscious poetry .(299) 
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In short, Arnold's position on the question of 
religion is complex and sometimes self-contradictory 
and extremely oppositional. Delaura delineates it in 
this way. 
Arnold's strategy is complex. Against 
Orthodox Christians he argues that the 
notion of a Personal God is unintelligible and 
unverifiable --according to a special notion 
of verification. Against the rationalizing 
philosophical Liberals (whose positivism he 
accepts) he argues, nevertheless, that the 
masses need emotional and imaginative 
support for the practice of morality, 
considered as a comforting and uplifting 
poetic testimony to righteous-ness ... as 
verified through the whole of man's history. 
Finally, against what Arnold sees as the 
compro- mising non-Christian but theistic 
devotees of Utilitarianism, he argues that 
their logic is unsound, since they reject 
individual Christian doctrines as incredible 
or irrational but fail to recognize that 
Christian theology is a logically valid 
concatenation of probabilities and that only 
by striking at the root of all theology can 
individual Christian tenets be cast 
down.(1 05-6) 
One actually has to speak of positions, for Arnold 
shifts his grounds very frequently in a series of 
repressions and displacements. Here, Arnold the 
thinker, Arnold the poet, Arnold the reformer, Arnold 
the critic, and Arnold the strategist get mixed up. He 
apparently cannot rely on faith alone to conceive of 
God and His will, nor can he rely on reason, according 
to which God is "unverified and unverifiable"(Delaura 
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1 02). However, Christian theology has its logic and 
God is not completely dead. So, the major religious 
assumptions of his thought seem to totter because he 
wants them all and cannot rest with onesidedness, as 
one can see in Culture and Anarchy. This is his 
problem, and so with each faction he has to repress 
one part of his. This is, in my opinion, the essence of 
his strategy as he searches for the perfect but 
impossible formula to save the difficult marriage he 
has envisioned. 
And when we consider the non-religious 
assumptions of Arnold's ideal of cultured people, "to 
make reason and the will of God prevail,"in the light 
of his other pronouncements, we witness a similar 
dilemma. In this context, we are on the human level, 
for, like all humanistic movements, Arnold's 
humanism rests on some secular, psychological 
assumptions about human nature. The importance of 
this component has been highlighted by a modern 
humanist. Against Foucault's anti-humanistic stand, 
Noam Chomsky declares, "Our job is to 'try to create 
the vision of a future just society, that is to create ... 
a humanistic social theory that is based, if possible, 
on some firm and humane concept of the human 
essence or human nature"'(The Foucault Reader 5). In 
the absence of such carefully and objectively 
established program, one may find oneself in the 
unfelicitous position of the protagonist of Rex 
Warner's novel The Philosopher, whose idealism is 
smashed by the forces of reality and who ends up as a 
victim of Fascism. 
A reading of Arnold's writings demonstrates that 
human nature is a core issue in his mind and a 
building block of his theories and programs. In 
"Literature and Science" the war against the 
"Nebuchadnezzars"(413) of culture, those who insist 
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on g1v1ng science a prominent place in the curriculum 
at the expense of the humanities, is declared and 
waged in the name of the "constitution of human 
nature"("Science" 415). He speaks of man's 
fundamental desire for good, which "acts in us when 
we feel the impulse for relating our knowledge to our 
sense for conduct and to our sense for 
beauty"(" Science" 417). This instinct works in 
conjunction with a wider and deeper instinct of "self-
preservation," so that the former serves the latter. 
Apparently, Arnold suggests here that with knowledge 
conjoined to conduct and beauty one can shape one's 
life in a such a way as to preserve what is good for 
one and to perpetuate one's life and existence on 
earth. Nonetheless, one can detect in such formulation 
an uneasy balance between a down-to-earth 
Darwinian view and a Platonic idealism, especially 
that the line between the individual and the species is 
vague. Does the desirable self-preservation of one 
individual override the good of another? Is the good of 
one compatible with that of another? The Platonic 
tendencies gain momentum when Arnold expands his 
views of human nature and speaks of its various 
aspects. Those are "the power of conduct, the power 
of intellect, and the power of social life and 
manners"("Science" 415). When the claims of these 
powers are "met and adjusted," then it will be 
possible to attain to a state of "soberness"(Science 
407) and "righteousness"("Science" 407) united with 
"wisdom"(407), these being three Platonic virtues by 
which the human soul can be elevated. One can see 
that wholeness is an Arnoldian virtue achieved by 
connectedness. However, one has to bear in mind that 
between this optimistic vision and another vision 
expressed earlier in his verse there is a significant 
dissonance that defines Arnold's repression and 
sublimation, as we will see later. 
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Similarly, human nature figures prominently in his 
classic Culture and Anarchy. He quotes Montesquieu, 
"'The first motive which ought to impel us to study is 
the desire to augment the excellence of our nature, 
and to render an intelligent being yet more 
intelligent"'(473). Perfection is a pivotal issue in his 
conception of culture as well as in the bulk of his 
though: "Culture is then properly described not as 
having its origin in curiosity •. but as having its origin 
in the love of perfection; it is a study of 
perfection"(473). Morality is another central issue: "It 
[culture] moves by the force not merely or primarily 
of the scientific passion for pure knowledge, but also 
of the moral and social passion for doing good"(473). 
These two objectives culminate in the ultimate goal 
of culture, "to make reason and the will of God 
prevail." 
Such culture is best embodied in the aliens, who are 
Arnold's answer to England's problems at the time. 
They are an elitist group of cultured people who have 
overcome their class allegiances and risen above 
their ordinary selves to be governed by their best 
selves, "persons who are mainly led, not by their 
class spirit, but by a general humane spirit, by the 
love of human perfection"(Culture 538). Additionally, 
they are distinguished not by "their Barbarianism or 
their Philistinism, but by their humanity"(Culture 
573). These are Arnold's social heroes and saviors, 
the creations of his vast optimism and giant idealism 
as they emerge in his diagnosis of the malaise of his 
world and society, though where to find them and how 
to breed them remain a matter of great difficulty and 
mystery. 
Such views, worthy as they are, cannot be taken for 
granted, especially when they are considered with 
Arnold's other works in the background. On the one 
65 
hand, they are based on psychological and 
philosophical assumptions of grave consequences and 
weighty implications: the possibility of knowledge, 
man's ability and willingness to utilize it in order to 
initiate action, and the necessary connection and 
compatibility of these two powers. Further, one 
wonders if there is in human nature a fundamental 
desire for good as well as an "invincible 
desire"("Science" 419) to relate knowledge to the 
two senses of conduct and beauty. On the other hanct, 
Arnold's poetry, written mainly before the bulk of his 
prose, shows no aliens acting under real pressures. 
His poetic "heroes" fall short of his aliens, a fact 
which means that he had no notion of his cultural 
supermen during his early stage. In his verse he is 
compassionate, elegiac, and tragic as he meditates on 
the painful human condition, whereas in his prose he 
wages his holy war against the enemies of society --
Barbarians, Philistines, and Populace. Here he is 
particularly tough, oppositional, and even belligerent 
in his optimistic mission to define the elements of 
his humanistic program. 
Man in Arnold's prose is perfectible, but in his 
poetry he is dramatized as simply incapable of 
perfection, and his knowledge is tenuous and flimsy. 
In other words, while Arnold's projected, wished-for 
aliens promise Promethean achievements, his 
Sisyphean poetic characters plod the steepy and 
rugged roads of life or are tossed around by hidden 
forces in a Hardyesque universe, as Persoon 
demonstrates, though with less force and sarcasm. 
His short poem "Destiny" epitomizes the whole 
picture: 
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Why each is striving, from the old, To love 
more deeply than he can? till would be true, 
yet still grows cold? --Ask of the Powers 
that sport with man. 
They yok'd in him, for endless strife, A 
heart of ice, a soul of fire, And hurl'd him on 
the Field of Life, An aimless unallay'd 
Desire. 
This helpless, divided, blind creature of desire is a 
far cry from man as projected in Arnold's prose, 
which scintillates with high hopes and expectations. 
While one may accept Daniel's view that "the concept 
of social utility provides an integral part of Arnold's 
conception of culture"(9), his verse presents a 
difficult picture. Here man is a battlefield of 
impulses and forces that somehow stifle will and 
cloud vision. What one wills is frustrated by desire, 
and what one intends is foiled by mysterious powers. 
His poem "Human Life" provides the image. No one can 
claim that on life's sea one has kept "uninfringed ... 
[one's] nature's law." A necessary elaboration 
concludes the poem: 
Even so we leave behind, 
As, charter'd by some unknown Powers, 
We stem across the sea of life by night, 
The joys which were not for our use 
design'd;--
The friends to whom we had no natural right, 
The homes that were not destined to be ours. 
Another Hardyesque theme concludes his poem "To 
Marguerite, in Returning a Volume of the Letters of 
Ortis": 
Who order'd, that their longing's fire 
Should be, as soon as kindl'd, cool'd? 
Who renders vain their deep desire?--
A God, a God their severance ruled! 
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And bade betwixt their shores to be 
The unplumb'd, salt, estranging sea. 
In this regard, one may introduce Arnold's v1s1on of 
old age, only to realize that it is mournful and even 
distressful, contrasting sharply with Browning's 
vision in "Rabbi Ben Ezra": 
What is it to grow old? 
Is it to lose the glory of the form, 
The lustre of the eye? 
Is it for beauty to forego her wreath? 
--Yes, but not this alone. ("Growing Old") 
The crescendo rises until it peaks with 
It is --last stage of all--
When we are frozen up within, and quite 
The phantom of ourselves, 
To hear the world applaud the hollow ghost 
Which blamed the living man. 
Even self-knowledge, that great classical ideal, is 
hardly attainable, no matter how passionately one 
seeks it: 
And on earth we wander, groping, reeling; 
Powers stir in us, stir and disappear. 
Ah, and he, who placed our master-feeling, 
Fail'd to place our master-feeling clear. 
We but dream we have our wish'd -for 
powers. 
Ends we seek we never shall attain. ("Self-
Deception") 
The same theme is taken up in "The Buried Life." Men 
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live in disguise, "alien to the rest I Of men, and alien 
to themselves," since they are driven by separate 
laws, symbolized in each by the buried stream. So, 
even if they seem to be eddying forth here and there, 
they are actually governed by the predetermined 
forces of their respective inner selves. Identity, 
being predestined and fixed, makes free action 
impossible. Fate is in control: 
Fate, which foresaw 
How frivolous a baby man would be--
By what distractions he would be possess'd, 
Bade through the deep recesses of our breast 
The unregarded river of our life 
Pursue with indiscernible flow its way; 
And that we should not see 
The buried stream, and seem to be 
Eddying at large in blind uncertainty, 
Though driving on with it eternally. 
("The Buried Life") 
The rare moment of self-knowledge, when love 
unlocks the breast and man "becomes aware of his 
life's flow," is overclouded with skepticism, "And 
then he thinks he knows/The hills where his life 
rose,/And the sea where it goes" (emphasis mine). 
Thus, with such decrepit capacity for knowledge, one 
is worse off since one cannot have the chance of 
relating it to other powers of conduct, beauty, and 
social life to maintain one's good and existence on 
earth. Thus, wholeness is disintegrated. 
In the light of the above, it seems that Arnold's 
Sisyphean characters have a large capacity for 
suffering. Even his "heroes" seem to belie his wishful 
formulas. They are aliens and escapists: anti-social, 
egoistic, and solipsistic. This failure to integrate 
69 
appears on another level, producing another fracture 
in the psyche of Arnold's "heroes," who are alienated 
from their communities and default any meaningful 
equitable interaction with the people around them. 
Thus, they suppress another power envisioned by 
Arnold, the power of social life. Here, too, his 
aspirations and expectations soar too high above 
common earth. If we consider some of his great 
poems, we meet some of his "heroes," who are 
somehow aloof, isolated, even anti-social, developing 
a relation of superiority towards their fellow men. 
The dominant relation is that of a teacher inculcating 
ideas in a student in rather inappropriate conditions. 
What results is ill-timed, incongruous pedantry, 
"theorizing and preaching." The speaker in "Dover 
Beach" is a flagrant example. Although we sympathize 
with him in the abstract as one of the sages of the 
age, he is hardly sympathetic in the poetic frame. 
Anthony Hecht's "The Dover Bitch: A Criticism of Life" 
may not qualify as a critical appraisal of the poem, 
but its titillating sarcasm is not, after all, irrelevant 
or irreverent. Empedocles is another example 
pedandic, aloof, boastful, and narcissistic, all in a 
tedious and brusque manner. Even when he is 
considering suicide, he cannot relinquish his pedestal 
as a teacher to those around him although he is 
proving at every step his incapacity to put his 
philosophy to a life-saving practice, sinking instead 
in self-pity and ennui. Having preached at great length 
to Pausanias, he ruminates in melancholy: 
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But I 
The weary man, the banish'd citizen, 
Whose banishment is not his greatest ill, 
Whose weariness no energy can reach, 
And for whose hurt courage is not the cure-
What should I do with life and living more? 
No, thou art come too late, Empedocles! 
And the world hath the day, and must break 
thee, 
Not thou the world. With men thou canst not 
live, 
Their thoughts, their ways, their wishes, 
are not thine; 
And being lonely thou are miserable, 
For something has impair'd thy spirit's 
strength, 
And dried its self-sufficing fount of joy. 
Empedocles, in short, drifts in limbo, having neither 
the capacity to enjoy life with others on equal footing 
nor the credentials of self-sufficiency. 
Such is the plight of the Scholar-Gipsy, who 
decides to live outside society and time, leading a 
gipsy life in self-irl")posed exile, and who, contrary to 
Arnold's preaching about man's fundamental desire for 
good, comes to no such thing, 
Who, tired of knocking at preferment's door 
One summer-morn forsook 
His friends, and went to learn the gipsy-
lore 
And roam'd the world with that wild 
brotherhood, 
And came, as most men deem'd, to little good, 
But came to Oxford and his friends no more. 
And if he decides to return to civilized life, it is 
only when he can be a teacher imparting the secrets 
of gipsy life to a willing and enthusiastic audience, 
when he can be a self-appointed and self-important 
teacher. Surprisingly, Arnold seems to relate to such 
a selfish, anti-social, uncommitted gipsy impulse, 
while in his prose he dreams of a fulfilled and 
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fulfilling life of the best self of his aliens, those 
emblems of culture. A certain paradox lurks in the 
lines: "Thou hast not lived, why should'st thou perish, 
so?/Thou hadst one aim, one business, one 
desire;/Eise wert thou long since numbered with the 
dead!/Eise hadst thou spent, like other men, thy fire!" 
It is good to have escaped social life among men and 
women of equal standing, to have fled , living with 
them, felt with them, suffered with them, and died 
with them, for better or worse. The Scholar-Gipsy, 
Empedocles, and the Dover lover have a great deal of 
the recluse, of Hamlet, of the Byronic hero, and of the 
young Arnold, but very little of the social activist, 
the social worker, or the aliens. They stand in 
contradistinction with the fulfilling whole life 
Arnold preaches so vehemently in "Literature and 
Science," as we have seen. 
Moreover, Arnold's characters are presented in the 
throes of a conflict which amounts to a tragedy and 
which underlines the poet's tragic vision of life. The 
tragic situation, as John Farrell argues, obtains when 
the tragic hero is caught in the whirlpool of 
change(99-118) or, rather, as the poet himself puts 
it, "wandering between two worlds, one dead,/The 
other powerless to be born." Falkland, as Farrell 
shows, is such a tragic hero, "Arnold attempts to 
generalize the fate of his protagonists by relating 
their experience to a tragic disorder in the movement 
of history"(1 02). This romantic vision makes them 
guiltless victims rather than victimizers. Empedocles 
is "Arnold's most impressive portrayal of the 
guiltless hero"(Farrell 1 09). Burham calls him "the 
modern part of Arnold, the part of him that had to live 
in the burning plain of Victorian England, condemned 
to be subject to the flux of a thousand divided aims, 
condemned to live the nightmare of history"(9). The 
persona of "Dover Beach" is another "modern" man at 
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war with history, with the Sophoclean world of "ebb 
and flow," though he seems to have softened into a 
state of mellow acquiscence and even of hopeful 
expectation that human misery is, by a mysterious 
law of nature, bound to subside. 
Nevertheless, Arnold's tragic hero is also a victim 
of himself, thus becoming somehow an enemy of 
himself and a force against his "fundamental desire 
for good." Farrell hints at an "inadequacy inherent in 
his [Empedocles'] temperament"(1 09). Actually, this 
inadequacy is a tragic flaw that accelerates his fall 
and wrings his heart in the meantime. In this way, 
character becomes an enslaving power that fetters 
the hero's body and mind rather than a tool of self-
fulfillment towards his inherent desire for good, let 
alone perfection. Sometimes, the hero can grasp the 
forces at work in history and society but cannot bring 
himself to act in order to alleviate his sufferings. It 
seems that he becomes a lover of pain, a masochist 
luxuriating in his afflictions and contemplating a 
distressful order of things and values experienced 
with his lost paradise in the background. 
Empedocles and the Dover lover are seen in varying 
degrees in the grips of such a situation. Adhering to a 
vanishing standard, they do nothing but to disparage 
the present. They, somehow, identify with the 
absolute standard. Empedocles becomes this standard 
and consequently fails to see the present realistically 
and objectively, eschewing it as if it were an 
epidemic. Such solipsism explains his refusal to 
realize that the absolute is not some fixed Platonic 
idea but rather the very process of history itself, the 
flux of change and development, a fact which the 
Dover lover has managed to grasp and embrace, though 
reluctantly. Callicles, who stands for this burgeoning 
understanding of the new absolute and who is thus 
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determined to celebrate nature, poetry, and music, 
knows that Empedocles is to blame: 
He is too scornful, too high-wrought, too 
bitter. 
Tis not the times, 'tis not the sophists vex 
him; 
There is some root of suffering in himself, 
Some secret and unfollow'd vein of woe, 
Which makes the time look black and sad to 
him. 
As a result, Empedocles cannot live here and now; he 
chooses death, but not until he rails irresponsibly and 
blindly against the world and mankind as the cause of 
his fall. His solipsism is further characterized as a 
mind "preying on itself." Knowing what may remedy 
his condition, he turns his back to it. Actually, he 
believes that man's desire for good, which is 
fundamental for Arnold, is the root of a serious 
delusion that "the world does but exist that welfare 
to bestow." So, he has settled down into a state of 
futile dejection and idle reflection on the human 
condition on earth, persisting in his blindness to his 
own good. Theoretically, he can see the new law, but 
psychologically he is too rigid to change. In his case 
knowledge does not necessarily lead to action. 
Such is the case of the Dover lover, who suffers 
from the Empedocles' complex as he confronts the 
flux of history. A keen observer and interpreter of life 
as he dissects it at Dover, he is incapable of going 
beyond thought and dogmatic preaching to his 
girl/wife as seeing, hearing, and analyzing prove 
impotent and idle defense mechanisms vacillating 
between escape and fake control, while the forces of 
history --natural, impersonal, and supernatural-- do 
their task, irrespective of man's thoughts and wishes: 
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The Sea of Faith 
Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's 
shore 
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furl'd. 
But now I only hear 
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar, 
Retreating, to the breath 
Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear 
And naked shingles of the world. 
The concluding lines outline the position of a man 
who, knowledgeable, moralistic, and sensitive as he 
is, cannot do anything about his dark reality, "And we 
are here as on a darkling plain/Swept with confused 
alarms of struggle and flight,/Where ignorant armies 
clash by night." Such is the plight of the Dover lover 
as well as Empedocles. Something stifles them from 
within, a burning sense of agony and despair, a noble 
rigidity of character causing a paralysis of the soul 
and body as they idly and impotently watch history 
unfold impersonally, irrevocably, and uncontrollably. 
History in both cases may be the occasion of tragedy, 
but character is its actual cause. 
Eventually, the disjunction between knowledge and 
conduct re-erupts powerfully and is even 
institutionalized in Culture and Anarchy as a 
polarized division under the name of Hellenism and 
Hebraism. In what seems as an instance of the return 
of the repressed, Arnold speaks of these as two 
passions which alternate in civilizations and history 
and which can only be united in wishful thought. 
Hellenism is a passion for knowing, and Hebraism for 
doing. The dichotomy is complete, "And these two 
forces we may regard as in some sense rivals, --
rivals not by the necessity of their own nature, but as 
exhibited in man and his history,-- and rivals dividing 
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the empire of the world between them"(558). He adds, 
"Hebraism and Hellenism --between these two points 
of influence moves our world"(558). In other words, 
man's nature does not pass spontaneously and 
necessarily from knowledge to action. Obviously, 
what Arnold is envisioning is a nature higher than 
ordinary common nature. Again, he is torn between 
what is real and what is ideal, between gloomy 
reality and fantastic dream. His poetic "heroes" are 
often so caught up, like Hamlet, in the whirlpool of 
thought, self-analysis, and meditation that they seem 
to be waiting for some external, impersonal force to 
deliver them from the suffocating realities of the 
here and now, though, unfortunately, Godot does not 
show up. As aliens, in the negative sense, they reject 
any integration with the world around them, but such 
alienation is to be repressed giving way to the new 
aliens of Arnold's sublimating mind. 
On the basis of the above argument, humans are 
unhappy in Arnold's poetry because they, almost by 
constitution, are afflicted by a serious disjunction 
between knowledge and action, by an inablity to 
recognize the law of flux, and by a desperate clinging 
to an absolute standard of values and ideas. 
Empedocles, the Dover lover, and the Scholar-Gipsy 
all illustrate this tragic situation in different 
degrees. The first, governed by Thanatos not Eros, 
resolves the "to be or not to be" question by jumping 
into Etna. The second refuses to celebrate love at 
Dover and chooses to sit and wait. The third seeks 
self-fulfill met outside time and society, making of 
his escape a mission to learn the secrets of gipsy life 
in order to impart it later to established society, a 
promise he does not keep. The three "heroes," also in 
varying degrees, fail to connect what seems in 
Arnold's theoretical framework a perfect synthesis of 
knowledge, conduct, beauty, and social life, all fused 
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together under the guidance of the principles of good 
and self-preservation that are inherent in man, a 
fusion that takes account of the whole man as history 
unfolds. 
It is no wonder, then, that Arnold withdrew 
"Empedocles on Etna" from his 1853 Poems, and the 
decision has sparked a number of insightful critical 
theories which attempt to explain it in view of 
Arnold's career as a poet, thinker, and social critic. 
Jonathan Culler finds the reason in Carlyle's 
influence, 
... the chapter on the Everlasting Yea in Sartor 
Resartus. Under the guise of solving an aesthetic 
problem Arnold has solved a moral one: he has 
attempted to cure his hero --and himself-- of Ro-
mantic morbidity by the advice of Carlyle to for-
get about oneself, turn outward upon the world, 
and engage in practical action.(202) 
Culler adds, "The main significance .. . of Arnold's 
rejection of 'Empedocles on Etna' and his writing the 
preface of 1853 is that he was thereby moving from 
subjectivity to objectivity"(203); that is, from 
Romanticism to Victorianism. 
Culler's argument answers some important 
questions about Arnold's career. However, it suggests 
that the change was a willful and deliberate act, a 
fact which, while dividing Arnold into two, renders 
his sincerity questionable after that major poem of 
his career. 
The same question was also addressed by Kenneth 
Allott, who adds some details, though the thrust of 
his argument does not shift considerably: "The 
increasing difficulty Arnold found in writing poetry 
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after "Empedocles on Etna " was ... due ultimately to 
his decision to hold back something of himself in the 
act of creation .. . and this decision is connected with 
his need to settle down, come to terms with ordinary 
life, and 'mature'"(68). Allott bases his argument on a 
Jetter Arnold sent to his sister in which the poet 
voices his dissatisfaction with his tragedy Merope 
and mentions the sacrifices exacted by good poetry, 
which combines "' perfection in the region of thought 
and feeling"'(qtd. in Allott 68) with "'perfection of 
form'"(qtd. in Allott 68). He adds, by implication, that 
"'he cannot bear anything not very good"'(qtd. in Allott 
68). All this can be readily understood in the light of 
his many public duties which began to overburden him 
physically and mentally. 
Both Culler and Allott are exclusively concerned 
with "Empedocles on Etna," though Arnold's verse as a 
whole depicts passionately and sadly a vision of the 
sorrowful human condition. Moreover, "difficulty" 
could be taken to indicate a significant dimension of 
Arnold: his striving for perfection in this field as 
well as in others. This ambition points to a process of 
sublimatiom. which culminates, as I have said earlier, 
in a theory of poetry as religion and in a series of 
prose works that sublimate his poetic vision of the 
possibilities of mankind in the emergence of his new 
heroes, the aliens. 
As for the transformation from subjectivity to 
objectivity, something which the two critics 
subscribe to, this needs a re- considerarion which 
should begin with some questions. In human sciences 
what do subjectivity and objectivity signify? Are 
they to be viewed in terms of subject matter or 
method? In many of his poems Arnold addresses the 
human condition, though lyrically and elegiacally. This 
is objectivity in the choice of matter, but not in tone. 
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In prose he addresses public matter, but the 
perspective is subjective. 
It is true that one may find strong support for his 
rejection of subjectivity in his 1853 "Preface," but, 
apart from its being indirect, it applies to the poem 
under consideration. He denounces two forms of 
subjectivity. First, he condemns what might be called 
historical subjectivity where an ancient subject is 
inconsistently presented from a contemporary 
viewpoint. His "Empedocles on Etna" illustrates this 
form: 
Into the feelings of a man so situated there 
entered much that we are accustomed to consider 
as exclusively modern .... What those who are 
familiar only with the great monuments of early 
Greek genius suppose to be its exclusive 
characteristics, have disappeared; the calm, 
the cheerfulness, the disinterested objectivity 
have 
disappeared: the dialogue of the mind with itself 
has commenced. ("Preface" 185) 
The other form of subjectivity deals with the 
principle that a 
" true allegory of the state of one's own mind in a 
representative history .. . is perhaps the highest thing 
that one can attempt in the way of poetry"("Preface" 
193).This form is also condemned in connection with 
his strong bias for the ancients against the moderns. 
As for the mainspring of his new program, it falls 
neatly into line with his unceasing self-amelioration, 
with the ancients serving as models. He strives to be 
one who chooses "to delight himself with the 
contemplation of some noble action of a heroic time, 
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and to enable others, through his representation of it, 
to delight in it also"(" Preface" 201 ). Actually, this is 
what defines his progress and unifies his canon and 
career: a series of repressions succeeded by 
sublimation. In 1849 he published The Strayed 
Reveller. and Other Poems, signed by the half-
revelatory "A," but soon he repressed it. In 1852 he 
published "Empedocles on Etna." and Other Poems. 
However, he was still dissatisfied. In 1853 he issued 
his Poems without "Empedocles on Etna." The poem 
was repressed because of his new noble conviction of 
the function of poetry. In other words, the poem was 
repressed, though his post-1853 works betray 
vestigious returns of the repressed. 
Similarly, his humanistic quest follows the same 
pattern. It starts with an extended elegy on the human 
condition, an elegy that rises sometimes to tragic 
heights with agony and half-despair not softened by 
Hardy's sarcasm and irony. He then moves towards 
more positive thinking, along the same lines shown 
above. He banishes his fears and doubts, providing 
himself and his readers with hope and promise of 
better times, and seeking perfection on both personal 
and social levels. The same Arnold breathes 
throughout. His objectivity is, I believe, subjectivity 
on a higher level, a form of sublimation supervening a 
repression. This is the delight he experiences and that 
he hopes to infuse into his readers without 
compromising his sincerity. 
The psychological process of repression and 
sublimation appears more clearly in another way. For 
example, the word "alien" is employed in a negative 
sense in his poem "The Buried Life," suggesting a 
pathetic and painful state. This same word is used as 
the name of his cultural heroes in Culture and 
Anarchy. So, the word is repressed in one sense and 
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sublimated into a noble one. Loneliness, isolation, 
detachment, and aloofness take on positive 
connotaions as they turn into freedom from class 
interests and into disinterestedness. The process is 
laid out in Culture and Anarchy, where aliens are 
defined as an elitist group of social workers who have 
repressed their "ordinary" selves(536) and live by 
their best selves, who have repressed their individual 
interests and live for communal welfare. Egoistic 
superiority in his poetry, which takes the form of a 
person teaching others, becomes now positive 
altruistic leadership. Man, divided and aimless in his 
poetry, is now a unified, fully integrated person, self-
conscious and socially-oriented. Finally, poetry, as 
we have seen, is elevated from grief without outlet, 
through elegy, tragedy, and delight, to religion. This is 
the rising curve of Arnold's thought and life. 
On the other hand, subjectivity remains strong in 
Arnold even after his 1853 Preface. His conservatism, 
which Delaura discusses at length( 168 ff. ), his 
hankering after a lost utopia, and his idealism put him 
in the company of men like Carlyle, Newman, and 
Pater. It is as a conservative in an age of rapid and 
cataclysmic change that he must have felt his tragic 
situation, as "Stanzas from the Grand Chartreuse" 
shows. Somehow, as an intellectual, he was losing his 
ground in an age of more aggressive and more 
effective social, political, and economic forces. 
Intellectual life, as Houghton shows(14-16), was 
forfeiting its prestige, and knowledge was being 
infested with relativism52 which he calls 
provinciality, a term used to describe the absence of 
an "intellectual metropolis like an academy"("The 
Literary Influence of Academies" 283). Culture, which 
remains his focal point, is brought into the 
discussion, for "to get rid of provinciality is a certain 
stage of culture"("Academies" 283). 
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And it is this mission of eradicating provinciality 
that Arnold assigns to himself, a fact which reflects 
an acute awareness of his tragic situation as a 
humanist fighting a last-ditch battle for established 
standards, a position reminiscent of Empedocles: 
It is not that there do not exist in England, as in 
France, a number of people perfectly able to 
discern what is good ... from what is bad, and 
prefer- ring what is good; but they are isolated, 
they form no powerful body of opinion, they are 
not strong enough to set a standard, up to which 
even the journey-work of literature must be 
brought, if it is to be vendible.("Academies" 280} 
The issue is now clear. The forces of culture, 
including Arnold himself, are not sufficiently strong 
nor well-organized to stand against the encroaching 
forces of provinciality, relativism, and anarchy.The 
repressed material gives force to his already 
passionate personal involvement, which explains his 
oppositional attitudes as he addresses public 
matters, clashing almost with everybody --with the 
Middle classes, Liberalism, Barbarians, Philistines, 
Populace, Laissez-faire, materialism, mechanism, 
Puritanism, Harrison, Bright, Bentham, Pascal, The 
Times. The Daily Telegraph, and a host of other 
enemies. Empedocles-like, Arnold is at war with the 
times. His subjectivity is still active. 
Another aspect of Arnold's living subjectivity is 
his strong affiliation with Oxford and loyalty to its 
values and standards. As an Oxford scholar, he is 
involved in the battle for culture, for sweetness and 
light, for which that institution stands. The relation 
is tinged with lyricism, "Beautiful city! So venerable, 
so lovely, so unravaged by the fierce intellectual life 
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of our country, so serene!"("Oxford, The Home of Lost 
Causes" 468-9). The defeat of Oxford in the social 
battle begins to take on a personal color, for the 
Oxford of sweetness and light is also the Oxford of 
lost causes: "I say boldly that this our sentiment for 
beauty and sweetness, our sentiment against 
hideousness and rawness, has been at the bottom of 
our attachment to so many beaten causes, of our 
opposition to so many triumphant movements"(Culture 
491). 
Such are the features of Arnold's humanism on its 
two levels. Man, as a pitiable creature thrown on this 
earth under the influence of numerous forces and 
passions but always governed by irrevocable fate, 
seems irreconcilable with Arnold's cultured man who 
is governed by his love of perfection and who aims at 
"making reason and the will of God prevail." In such a 
Hardyesque universe, where resignation is the most 
efficacious antidote, Arnold's idealistic humanism 
seems luxurious, detached, and even cruel. It wavers 
between the dream and the nightmare, fantasy and 
reality, but only to be tortured and disfigured. It 
appears that while Arnold's verse gives vent to his 
unconscious doubts and fears and to his innermost 
glimpses into the human condition, his prose, 
following an act of repression of his horrible, 
nightmarish visions, functions as a sublimation, a 
dogged defense mechanism aiming at keeping the 
distressful truths at bay. His return to tragedy 
towards the end of his career is significant. Falkland, 
as Farrell argues, is another Empedocles, who is never 
completely dead in Arnold's mind. His essay on 
Falkland, first published in 1877, is his way of 
suggesting that there is no exit out of the hurly-burly 
of the human condition, that man is caught in a 
Heideggarian fashion. The uncanny return of the 
repressed sadly concludes Arnold's humanistic quest, 
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while it underscores the repressions and highlights 
the sublimations which push him towards dogmatic 
absolutism, towards another level of subjectivity, for 
Arnold's prose is as much Arnold as his verse, and 
both help to identify a man at war with history, 
refusing to dispel a vision of a better world and 
perhaps a better man. Unfortunately, in such a 
complicated process and for such a complex 
personality, "consistency" seems to have been 
betrayed twice, first in presenting an ancient subject 
in modern clothes and second in solving modern 
problems according to ancient models, for,after all, 
Arnold's aliens are, to a large extent, modelled after 
Plato's philosophers. 
Thus, Arnold's humanism is a valuable contribution 
to its field. Actually, its very limitations serve as 
flashlights showing the need for a truly disinterested 
humanistic program based on a sound and realistic 
knowledge of human nature and abilities in the 
context of society and history and for a concerted 
coordination on the ground between criticism and 
political action. So, while Arnold's humanism has a 
great deal of the optimism of the Enlightenment, it 
savors of the modern and post-modern sense of crisis. 
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NOTES 
1. For more information on humanism see Hans 
Baron, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and Johan Huizinga. 
2. For more details on Arnold's religion and culture 
see Pat MaCarthy and Joseph Carroll. 
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